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The Quality of Analysts’ Earnings
Forecasts During the Asian Crisis:
Evidence from Singapore
ROGER K. LOH AND MUJTABA MIAN*
1. INTRODUCTION
It is now generally accepted that earnings forecasts issued by
financial analysts form an important input in the valuation of
firms by market participants. Prior studies that examine the
efficiency of these forecasts, however, find that they suffer
from certain systematic errors. For example, one of the most
widely documented errors is the tendency of analysts to issue
forecasts that are systematically optimistic, that is, forecasts that
are systematically higher than the actual earnings (see, for
example, O’Brien, 1988; Stickel, 1990; and Kang, O’Brien and
Sivaramakrishnan, 1994). Furthermore, analysts forecast changes
in earnings (whether positively or negatively signed) that are
larger in magnitude than the actual changes (De Bondt and
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Thaler, 1990). Finally, analysts in the US appear to underreact
(overreact) to bad (good) news (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999).
It remains an open question, however, as to what factors
induce the alleged inefficiencies in analysts’ forecasts. One per-
suasive explanation is that forecast biases are rational outcomes
of specific incentives that analysts face (Francis and Philbrick,
1993). For example, Das, Levine and Sivaramakrishnan (1998)
and Lim (2001) argue that analysts introduce an optimistic bias
in their forecasts to improve relations with corporate manage-
ment and ensure access to private information. To provide
empirical support for this assertion, the authors examine the
cross-sectional variation in forecast biases. They assert that earn-
ings for companies with greater informational uncertainty are
harder to predict, and therefore analysts have a greater need
for access to managers of such companies. Similarly, managers
of poorly performing companies would be less forthcoming in
disclosing information, and hence analysts would need to estab-
lish better relations with such companies.1 The biases in earn-
ings forecasts would, thus, be an increasing function of (1)
greater informational uncertainty and (2) poorer performance
of the companies being covered. Lim (2001) finds evidence that
supports both these predictions.2
An alternative explanation of forecast biases draws upon the
literature on behavioural finance. Such a view treats a forecast
as the outcome of a decision-making process in which an analyst
combines the available fundamental information with his per-
sonal judgement, which is likely to suffer from the same cognitive
biases as those of investors at large. De Bondt and Thaler
(1990), for example, argue that the over-estimation of earnings
changes by analysts is explained by the representativeness heur-
istic (Kahneman and Tversky, 1973). More recently, Daniel,
Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) model the over or
under-reaction of investors as a direct result of their cognitive
biases in information processing. These biases are likely to be
accentuated for diffuse tasks which require judgement than for
mechanical tasks which provide immediate feedback. This view
suggests that the predictable cross-sectional variation in forecast
biases uncovered by Das et al. (1998) and Lim (2001) can be
explained behaviourally. Making forecasts for companies with
greater informational uncertainty demand a more prominent
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role for human judgement, thereby escalating the potential
for judgemental biases. Hence, contrary to the claims of Das
et al. (1998) and Lim (2001), predictable cross-sectional increase
in forecast biases for companies with greater informa-
tional uncertainty could also be rationalised by a behavioural
explanation.
In contrast to the existing cross-sectional studies, our paper
examines the temporal variation in forecast biases. We first
draw upon three disparate strands of literature to develop a
comprehensive empirical framework to examine the efficiency
of analysts’ forecasts in Singapore. We then use this framework
to compare the efficiency of analysts’ forecasts issued during the
crisis period to that of forecasts made in the pre-crisis ‘normal’
period. Our special interest in the crisis period stems from the
observation that by its very definition, the crisis period had the
two characteristics, increased uncertainty and poorer corporate
performance, that according to the existing cross-sectional stud-
ies accentuate forecast biases.
The Asian crisis hit the region in early July 1997, starting with
the depreciation of the Thai Baht on 2 July, 1997.3 We separate
the forecasts made by analysts after the onset of the crisis (in the
period July 1997–1999) from those made during the pre-crisis
period of January 1990 to June 1997. Using these dates ensure
that issuers of crisis period forecasts already had the knowledge
of the crisis before issuing those forecasts. So, any inefficiency
found in the forecasts cannot be attributed to the fact that
the crisis itself was unexpected for most of the market parti-
cipants. This study focuses on Singapore as it has better quality
data available for analysts’ forecasts than other Southeast
Asian countries more affected by the crisis like Indonesia and
Malaysia.4
By comparing forecast inefficiencies across two periods, we
seek to achieve two objectives. First, such an analysis could help
us better discriminate the two competing explanations for the
observed forecast biases. If forecasts made during the crisis
period were to suffer more from systematic biases, it would be
consistent with the behavioural explanation, as cognitive biases
are likely to exacerbate during the highly uncertain crisis period
when more human judgement is needed to issue earnings fore-
casts. In contrast, there is no compelling reason to expect that
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agency concerns of analysts would escalate during the crisis
time. Second, it is important to know the degree of efficiency
of earnings forecasts during periods of heightened uncertainty,
as these are precisely the times when good forecasts have the
highest value.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we
review the previous literature to identify three notions of the
efficiency of analysts’ forecasts, and outline our research design.
In Section 3, we describe our data, and report our results.
Finally, Section 4 concludes the paper.
2. RESEARCH DESIGN
The extant literature contains three distinct notions of the effi-
ciency of analysts’ forecasts. Each of these notions appears to be
associated with a separate strand of literature. We bring
together these literatures to identify tests of forecast efficiency
that we, in Section 3, employ to examine the forecasts made
during pre and post-crisis periods.
(i) Optimism in Forecasts
The simplest and most tested notion of efficiency is that fore-
casted earnings should not be systematically higher or lower
than subsequently realised actual earnings. Let us define fore-
cast error as follows:
FEt ¼ Et  F
t1
t
P
ð1Þ
where Et is the actual earnings for a firm in year t, and F
t1
t is
the consensus forecast of the firms’s year t earnings made at
year t 1. Denominator P is the contemporaneous stock price at
the time of forecast that is used to scale the forecast errors to
control for the cross-sectional differences. Negative (positive)
values of errors in equation (1) imply that analysts issue fore-
casts that exceed (fall below) subsequently realised earnings. If
analysts’ forecasts were efficient, the forecast errors in equation
(1) averaged across companies would not statistically deviate
from zero.
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(ii) Extremism in Forecasted Change
The second notion of forecast efficiency relates to forecasted
changes in earnings. It differs from the first analysis in that it is
concerned with forecasted changes in earnings rather than fore-
casted amounts (De Bondt and Thaler, 1990). If analysts were to
exhibit extremism, they will forecast changes in earnings (whether
positively or negatively signed) that are larger in absolute magni-
tude than the actual changes. Following De Bondt and Thaler
(1990), we run the following model to test this view of efficiency:
ACt ¼ þ FCt þ "t: ð2Þ
This is essentially a regression of actual change against fore-
casted change to test the null hypothesis: (,)¼ (1, 0), against
the alternative: (,) 6¼ (1, 0). Actual earnings change, ACt¼
(EtEt1)/P, is the actual current year earnings change scaled
by the stock price at t 1. Forecasted change, FCt is simply
(Ft1t  Et1)/P. If analysts in Singapore systematically overesti-
mate changes in earnings,  will be significantly less than one,
signifying that analysts’ forecasts are characterised by extremism.
(iii) Optimal Reaction to News
Finally, the third notion of forecast efficiency implies that ana-
lysts should incorporate all earnings related news in a timely
manner and without bias into their forecasts.5 This dimension
of forecast efficiency does not require analysts to be accurate
all the times, but rather that their errors should not vary pre-
dictably with any identifiable earnings-related information. To
test this notion, Abarbanell and Bernard (1992) define a subset
of earnings related news – the prior-year’s earnings change, and
test whether forecast errors can be predicted using this variable.
They estimate the following equation using data from the US:
FEt ¼ 0 þ 1PERFt1 þ "t ð3Þ
where prior-year earnings change, PERFt1¼ (Et1Et2)/P, is
the variable employed as a proxy for news. If analysts were effi-
cient in incorporating prior-year earnings news into their fore-
casts, then the coefficient 1¼ 0. If analysts underreact (overreact)
to prior-year earnings change, 1 would be positive (negative).
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Before making definite conclusions on this generalised
underreaction to news, however, one needs to allow for the
possibility that analysts’ interpretation of news is contingent
upon the nature of the type of news (Easterwood and Nutt,
1999). To do so, we follow the procedure in Easterwood and
Nutt (1999). Firms are first grouped based on whether their
past performance has been bad, normal or good. This is to
identify potential implications of different prior-year perfor-
mance on current earnings. Equation (3) above can thus be
expanded as follows:
Ft1t Et1
P
¼0þ1LOPERFt1þ2HIPERFt1þ3PERFt1
þ4ðPERFt1LOPERFt1Þþ5ðPERFt1
HIPERFt1Þþ"t: ð4Þ
Within each year, firms are ranked according to the magni-
tude of their PERFt1 values. The top quartile firms are
considered to be high performers, and bottom quartile, low
performers. Firms lying in the middle two quartiles are
regarded as normal performers. HIPERFt1 is a dummy vari-
able which returns a value of ‘1’ when the firm’s performance
is in the higher quartile, and ‘0’ if otherwise. Similarly,
LOPERFt1 is coded ‘1’ when the firm’s performance is in
the lower quartile and ‘0’ if otherwise. The slope coefficient
3 measures the forecasted impact of prior-year perfor-
mance for the middle two quartiles. The combined slope coeffi-
cients (3þ4) and (3þ5) measure the forecasted impact
of prior performance for the lower and upper quartile respec-
tively. Intercept coefficients are interpreted in a similar manner.
Equation (4) models analysts’ forecasts of earnings change as
a function of the nature of prior-year performance. Following
this, we compare a similar model of actual earnings change as a
function of prior-year performance:
EtEt1
P
¼0 þ1LOPERFt1 þ2HIPERFt1 þ3PERFt1
þ 4ðPERFt1 LOPERFt1Þ þ 5ðPERFt1
HIPERFt1Þ þ "t: ð5Þ
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Notice that the dependent variable is now actual earnings change
instead of forecasted earnings change. A comparison of these two
models will tell us if analysts have incorporated efficiently the
information in prior-year earnings. Equation (6), depicted below,
is derived by subtracting equation (4) from equation (5):
Et  Ft1t
P
¼0 þ 1LOPERFt1 þ 2HIPERFt1 þ 3PERFt1
þ 4ðPERFt1  LOPERFt1Þ þ 5ðPERFt1
HIPERFt1Þ þ "t: ð6Þ
If analysts’ forecasts are based on the same parameters as the
actual process that generates them, then the forecast error
regression should have insignificant coefficients and no expla-
natory power. If however, analysts are inefficient in incorporat-
ing earnings-relevant information, then the forecast error
regression would be explanatory. If Abarbanell and Bernard’s
(1992) findings of under-reaction hold for all three classifica-
tions of prior performance, then all the slope coefficients should
be positive. If analysts’ responses are characterised by over-
reaction, then the slope coefficients should be negative. Finally,
if analysts are systematically optimistic (under-reacting to bad
news and over-reacting to good news), as reported by Easter-
wood and Nutt (1999), the combined coefficient of (3þ4) will
be positive and (3þ5) negative.
Our methodology has hitherto employed prior-year earnings
change (PERFt1) as a proxy for earnings related news.
However, as pointed out by Easterwood and Nutt (1999), one
possible weakness of using PERFt1 is that the magnitude of
prior-year earnings change may include both an expected
and unexpected component. If we focus only on the raw
earnings change, we may understate the inefficiency of analysts’
forecasts. This problem can be mitigated by using unexpected
prior-year earnings change, termed as UPERFt1, as the expla-
natory variable (Easterwood and Nutt, 1999). UPERFt1 is
simply PERFt1 minus the firm’s average earnings change
over the preceding three years (from t 2 to t 4), scaled by
their respective stock prices. The resulting reformulation of
equations (4) to (6) replaces PERFt1 with UPERFt1 as a news
proxy.6
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In the next section, we estimate the above models of fore-
cast efficiency separately for the pre and post-crisis periods to
detect potential differences in analysts’ forecasting ability during
periods of heightened economic uncertainty.
3. DATA AND RESULTS
We obtain our data from Institutional Brokers Estimates Systems
(I/B/E/S) International Inc. I/B/E/S collects earnings estimates
for listed firms that command sufficient institutional interest.
Defining the consensus forecast as the median forecast where
there are at least four analysts making earnings estimates (Elliot,
Philbrick and Weidman, 1995), we select eight-month ahead
forecasts as representative forecasts for year t’s earnings (Easter-
wood and Nutt, 1999). This horizon ensures that analysts have
the past year’s (t 1) annual report, and thus the previous year’s
earnings figures, available to them when they make their fore-
casts. It also takes into account the problem of stale forecasts on
I/B/E/S, highlighted by past research (O’Brien, 1988; and De
Bondt and Thaler, 1990).7 In addition, a firm is only included
in our sample if it has at least six consecutive years of actual
annual earnings data (t to t 5). Finally, we also require the
firm’s stock price P at the time of the forecast, available from
Datastream, for scaling our variables to control for heteroscedas-
ticity. All resulting variables of interest are denominated in Sin-
gapore dollars (SGD). Conversions, using the appropriate
exchange rates, are made when necessary. The average month-
end SGD/USD and SGD/GBP exchange rates in our sample
period are US$0.6282 and £0.3812 respectively.
In Singapore, I/B/E/S’s records of forecasts data begin in 1987
whilst actual earnings figures go as far back as 1985. The selection
criteria eventually yield a sample of 601 firm-year observations
spanning from 1990 to 1999 (henceforth referred to as the main
sample). We then partition the main sample into pre and post-
crisis sub samples.We expect the post-crisis sample to be smaller as
it spans only two years (mid 1997–1999). This, however, is miti-
gated somewhat by the increasing firm coverage by I/B/E/S
through the years. The eventual pre post-crisis samples consist of
494 and 107 firm-years respectively. We note that just prior to the
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crisis, our included firms derived an average of 83.2% of their total
sales from Asia including Singapore.8 Considering this exposure,
analysts issuing earnings forecasts for such firms after the onset of
the crisis will need to factor in the relevant implications of the crisis.
Table 1 lists the characteristics of the main sample. In Panel A,
we show the sample representation as a function of firm, industry
and year. The number of selected firms is 111, with each firm
represented an average (median) of 5 (6) times. By industry, there
were a total of 33 industries (as coded by I/B/E/S) represented with
a mean (median) of 24 (25) industries represented in each year.
Finally, in the ten years represented, each year contained a mean
Table 1
Sample Descriptives
Panel A: Sample Representation as a Function of Firm, Industry and Year
Number of Times Represented
Representation by: Total Min. Max. Mean Median Std. Dev.
Firm 111 1 10 5 6 3.04
Industry (IBES code) 33 5 30 24 25 7.20
Year 10 6 83 60 70 24.00
Panel B: Sample Distribution and Firm Size
Year No. of Firms
Average Assets
(S$m)
Average Market Value
(S$m)
1990 32 n.a. 1,114
1991 53 n.a. 1,026
1992 56 2,335 1,055
1993 67 3,119 1,619
1994 72 3,322 1,524
1995 75 3,599 1,564
1996 78 4,114 1,457
1997 79 4,741 1,118
1998 83 5,356 1,460
1999 6 2,078 1,068
Overall 601 3,583 1,300
Notes:
The sample consists of 601 firm-year observations that had eight-month ahead consen-
sus earnings forecasts, and at least six consecutive years of actual earnings available from
I/B/E/S. Average assets refer to the mean total assets (book value) of firms in that
particular year, denominated in Singapore dollars. In the same manner, average market
value is the average market value of included firms’ equity in that year.
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(median) of 60 (70) firms. In Panel B, we present details of the
sample distribution and firm size by year. From the firm-years
column, we observe that the number of firms followed is steadily
increasing since 1990. This we can ascribe to the increasing num-
ber of firm forecasts data collected by I/B/E/S over the years. For
1999, only early observations are available but we included them
to give us the maximum possible sample representation for the
post-crisis analysis. Panel B also gives us information of the size of
the average firm according to its book value of total assets and
market value of equity. Across the years, though there is a slight
increasing trend for average assets, the representative firm’s aver-
age market value has remained relatively stable.
(i) Optimism in Forecasts
To investigate the extent of optimism in analysts’ forecasts
across the pre and post-crisis periods, we calculate average
forecast errors for each year of our sample period. The results
are reported in Table 2. All except one of the forecast errors are
negatively signed, with four of them being significant. Testing
for the entire sample of ten years, the resultant forecast error
as a percentage of price is 1.29 (t¼5.87). It is also worth-
while for us to note that our median forecast error is negative
for seven out of ten years. Our results seem consistent with the
extant literature, suggesting that analysts display excessive opti-
mism. However, we notice that in the years 1997 and 1998,
analysts appear to exhibit larger magnitudes of optimism com-
pared to the earlier years. Bearing in mind that the crisis
began in 1997, this suggests that analysts committed greater
errors during the post-crisis period.
(ii) Extremism in Forecasted Change
Moving on to the second notion of efficiency, we examine for
similar discriminatory evidence surrounding the pre and post-
crisis periods. First, we report the main sample regression
results in Panel A of Table 3. Interestingly, our regression
coefficients bear a striking resemblance to De Bondt and Tha-
ler’s (1990) in that the slope coefficient  is significantly below
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one (0.639, t¼10.804). This signifies that the actual earnings
changes averaged only 64% of the forecasted earnings changes,
indicating extremism in analysts’ forecasts of earnings changes.
Upon closer examination of the sub samples in Panel B,
however, we fail to find evidence of extremism in the pre-crisis
period. The pre-crisis slope coefficient is observed to be insig-
nificantly different from one (0.981 t¼0.125), showing that
analysts were actually efficient in forecasting changes in earnings
for companies before the crisis. The strength of regression
(R2¼ 0.410, F¼ 342.217) corroborates this. In contrast, the
post-crisis regression is not significant with R2¼ 0.000
(F¼ 0.0351), implying that actual changes in earnings were
independent from analysts’ forecasted changes.
The increased uncertainty during the crisis period, thus,
appears to be associated with analysts exhibiting systematic
extremism that was absent during the pre-crisis period. This
Table 2
Forecast Errors by Year
Forecasts Error as a Percentage of Price
Year No. of Firms Mean Median Std. Dev. t–stat on Mean
1990 32 0.83 0.18 2.31 2.03
1991 53 0.39 0.44 2.97 0.96
1992 56 0.08 0.00 2.58 0.25
1993 67 0.42 0.52 4.14 0.83
1994 72 0.65* 0.00 2.62 2.10
1995 75 0.17 0.53 6.91 0.22
1996 78 0.62* 0.24 2.09 2.60
1997 79 2.57** 1.49 5.00 4.57
1998 83 5.22** 2.12 9.13 5.21
1999 6 1.35 0.31 4.79 0.69
Overall 601 1.29** 0.59 5.39  5.87
Notes:
The sample consists of 601 firm-year observations that had eight-month ahead con-
sensus earnings forecasts, and at least six consecutive years of actual earnings available
from I/B/E/S. Forecasts errors are presented here as a percentage of price, defined as:
FEt ¼ Et  F
t1
t
P
 100%
where Et is the actual reported earnings for year t, F
t1
t is the forecast of year t’s
earnings made eight months prior to year end, and P is the stock price at the time of
forecast. ** and * indicates a significance from zero at the 0.01 and 0.05 levels respectively.
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adds credit to the view that behavioural factors, rather than
agency concerns, are more salient in causing biases in analysts’
forecasts. Interestingly, our evidence also mirrors the cross sec-
tional differences in forecast biases reported by Das et al. (1998)
and Lim (2001) who find that forecast biases increase for com-
panies with greater informational uncertainty.
(iii) Optimal Reaction to News
Here we report the results of estimating equations (4) through
(6) using both measures of news as the explanatory variables on
Table 3
Regression of Actual Earnings Change on Forecasted Change
Sample Intercept Slope R2 F Stat
Panel A: Main Sample
Our main sample 0.010** 0.639** 0.163 116.713**
(4.437) (10.804)
De Bondt and Thaler’s 0.094** 0.648** 0.217 n.a.
sample1 (3.70) (21.7) (Adjusted R2)
Panel B: Pre and Post-crisis Sub Samples
Pre-crisis 0.005** 0.981 0.410 342.217**
(2.687) (0.125)
Post-crisis 0.034** 0.028** 0.000 0.035
(4.429) (6.359)2
Notes:
This table presents the parameter estimates for the model:
ACt ¼ þ FCt þ "t:
Actual earnings change, ACt, is given by (EtEt1)/P, which is forecasted change scaled
by price at t1. Forecasted change, FCt, is given by (Ft1t  Et1)/P, where F t1t is the
forecast of year t’s earnings made at t 1 (eight-month ahead). t-statistics for the
intercept and slope are reported in parentheses beneath the coefficient estimates.
The null hypothesis tested is: (, )¼ (0, 1). Our main sample consists of 601 firm-
year observations that had eight-month ahead consensus earnings forecasts, and at least
six consecutive years of actual earnings available from I/B/E/S. ** and * indicates that
the coefficient is significantly different from the tested null hypotheses at the 0.01 and
0.05 levels respectively.
1. We note that De Bondt and Thaler (1990) scaled the regression variables by the
standard deviation of earnings per share between years t 10 to t 2, whilst we scale
these variables by price.
2. Though the post-crisis slope of 0.028 is significantly different from one (t¼6.359),
it is not significantly different from zero. This is consistent with the observed non-
explanatory R2 of 0.000 (F¼ 0.035)
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the RHS.9 When reporting our results, we only report the
values of the combined coefficients to facilitate easy comprehen-
sion. As before, our intention is to detect any changes in ana-
lysts’ forecast efficiency, now viewed as their reaction to news,
during the crisis period. Regardless, it is informative to make
some general observations of analysts overall efficiency in the
main sample first. Table 4 documents the results of the model
which uses prior-year earnings change, PERFt1, as a surrogate
for earnings news.
All three regression models, presented for the main sample in
Table 4, are significant at better than 0.01. Significance of the
actual model (R2¼ 0.151, F¼ 21.101) shows that prior-year
earnings change is useful in explaining the current year earn-
ings change. Analysts themselves also do utilise the information
in prior-year earnings change when making predictions, as
shown by the significance of the forecasted change model
(R2¼ 0.508, F¼ 123.050). However, the significance of the
forecast error model (R2¼ 0.057, F¼ 7.141) suggests that ana-
lysts incorporate the available information incorrectly into their
forecasts.
Studying the combined coefficients next, we focus our atten-
tion on the first and fourth columns of Table 4, which describes
the impact of low prior-year performance. For the actual
change model (fourth column), we observe insignificant inter-
cept and slope coefficients, 0.006 (t¼1.271), and 0.027
(t¼0.443) respectively, telling us that low prior-year earnings
change has no influence on current year’s earnings change.
However, analysts wrongly assume that low prior-year perform-
ance positively impacts current year earnings. This is shown
in the first column where the analysts’ determined slope is
0.261 (t¼9.017). Within the low performers, 96% of them
have negatively signed prior-year earnings change. This implies
that in the face of negative prior earnings change, analysts
erroneously assume that the next year’s earnings would be
reversed.10 Finally, we look at the difference between the fore-
casted and actual earnings model to quantify the error. The
slope coefficient from the seventh column is significantly posi-
tive at 0.235 (t¼ 3.918). This indicates that analysts overestimate
the positive effect of low prior performance on current year
earnings, an under-reaction to negative news.
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Over or under-reaction is, however, absent when we compare
the forecasted and actual earnings models for high prior-year
performance. We look at the sixth column and observe that the
intercept and slope for the actual change model are 0.022
(t¼ 4.344) and 0.739 (t¼10.128) respectively. The negative
slope indicates that a stronger prior-year performance is
reversed in the following year. The forecasted earnings model
in column three shows similarly signed coefficients. Conse-
quently, the difference between the forecasted and the actual
model is not significant as given in column nine (intercept:
0.004, t¼0.823; slope: 0.018, t¼ 0.250). Analysts appear to
react optimally to news for firms with high prior-year performance.
Finally, we observe the impact of normal levels of perform-
ance by centring our attention on the second and fifth col-
umns. Almost all the coefficients are insignificant. Thus we
observe from column eight that there is little difference between
analysts’ determined and actual slope coefficients, suggesting
that analysts also do not over or under-react in response to
non-informative levels of prior-year performance. Based on
the results from the main sample, we observe that though
analysts do not under or over-react to high prior-year earnings
change, they under-react to low prior-year earnings change. We
next investigate whether this main sample result is driven by
analyst behaviour during the crisis period.
The pre and post-crisis regressions presented in Table 5 tells
a story consistent with our earlier findings from the first two
notions of efficiency. First, we focus on the pre-crisis sub sample
reported in Panel A. From the significance of the actual earn-
ings change model (R2¼ 0.619, F¼ 158.319), we see that
PERFt1 is useful in explaining actual current earnings change
before the crisis. Analysts also utilise this information when
forecasting earnings change (R2¼ 0.256, F¼ 33.597). However,
the results of the forecast error model indicate that analysts are
efficient in incorporating the information in prior-year earnings
into their forecasts (R2¼ 0.008, F¼ 0.785). Looking at column
seven to nine, we observe that all the slope coefficients are
insignificant, consistent with the low explanatory nature of the
regression. This means that regardless of the nature of prior
performance, analysts’ incorporate this information into their
forecasts efficiently, without under or over-reaction.
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Turning our attention to the post-crisis period (Panel B of
Table 5), we first note that the actual earnings change regression
model is insignificant (R2¼ 0.090, F¼ 1.998). This lack of
relationship has come about only after the crisis. Our pre-
crisis sub-sample had an explanatory regression (R2¼ 0.256,
F¼ 33.597), implying that prior performance of companies
had some permanent impact on subsequent year’s earnings.
But during the crisis, the firm’s prior performance, no matter
how good or bad, did not impact subsequent year’s earnings
changes. However, the high significance and R2 of the fore-
casted earnings model (R2¼ 0.763, F¼ 64.922) show that ana-
lysts mistakenly assumed a relationship, hence causing their
forecasts to be biased (R2¼ 0.295, F¼ 8.465). From the forecasts
error model (columns seven to nine), we find evidence of
under-reaction to low prior performance. The slope coefficient
in column seven is significantly positive (0.664, t¼ 3.592), show-
ing that analysts under-reacted to bad news.
We repeat the above analyses from Tables 4 and 5 with a
more refined proxy for news – unexpected prior-year earnings
change. The resulting coefficients (unreported) closely resemble
those reported for the previously employed proxy, and thus
corroborate our conclusions. We also conduct an additional
robustness test (not reported) that involves reclassification of
high and low performance companies as extreme deciles
instead of quartiles. If firms in the lowest performance decile
suffered more from the inefficiencies documented earlier for
the lowest performance quartile, this new classification would
strengthen the significance of our key results. If, instead, the
observed inefficiencies exist across the entire low performance
quartile, then demarcating only the last decile as low performers
should weaken our key results. This is because some of the
observations previously classified as low performance will now
be regarded as normal, and our statistical tests that compare
extreme groups to ‘normal’ groups would be less powerful.
Upon implementation, we document evidence for the latter
scenario – the significance level of the post-crisis under-reaction
to bad news, defined by PERFt1 (UPERFt1), reduces to about
0.13 (0.09). This suggests that the previously observed under-
reaction to bad news exists across the entire extreme quartile of
low performance firms.
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To sum up, we find no evidence of inefficiency in analysts’
reaction to prior-year earnings information in the pre-crisis
period. The under-reaction to bad news uncovered in the
main sample is due to analysts not fully incorporating negative
information during the crisis period. Our results point to a
structural change, after the onset of the crisis, in analysts’ ability
to react optimally to news. In particular, their under-reaction to
bad news during the crisis appears consistent with Daniel et al.’s
(1998) model in which market agents are over confident and
exhibit biased self-attribution. The model posits that these
agents believe too strongly in their own private information
and attach too little significance to public information. Analysts’
under-reaction to publicly available negative news, like the onset
of the crisis, is a possible manifestation of this theoretical model.
4. CONCLUSION
This paper examines the efficiency of analysts’ forecasts in
Singapore. While analysts’ forecasts before the crisis can be
described as efficient, the forecasts made during the crisis
period contained systematic biases. During this period, analysts
were systematically optimistic, forecasted earnings changes
that exceeded actual changes, and did not fully incorporate
negative earnings-related news. Interestingly, increased uncer-
tainty and poor recent performance, the two factors uncovered
by the existing literature to be associated with increased biases
in the cross-section of analysts’ forecasts, also appear to be
related to an increase in such biases during the crisis period.
We conjecture that such a temporal increase in forecast biases
could be due to behavioural factors. Our results, indeed, appear
to support recent models of behavioural finance in which
significant changes in market sentiment lead to structural breaks
in the behaviour of market participants (Barberis, Shleifer and
Vishny, 1998; and Brown and Cliff, 1999).
De Bondt and Thaler (1990) argue that analyses of analysts’
forecasts are important, as the rationality of analysts is likely to
be an upper bound for the rationality of the less sophisticated
common investors. Our results suggest that professional security
analysts, arguably amongst the most astute of market participants,
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exhibit systematic biases in forming their expectations during
periods of heightened economic uncertainty. This calls into
question the classical assumption about the rationality of the
marginal investor.
NOTES
1 In contrast, managers of companies with good news have every incentive
to push this news out to investors as fast as possible (Lang and Lundholm,
1993).
2 More specifically, Das et al. (1998) and Lim (2001) use forecast data from
the US and find that various proxies for the richness of a company’s
information environment, such as historical earnings variability, standard
deviation of weekly excess stock returns and market capitalisation, are
inversely related to forecast bias.
3 Economies that have been enjoying buoyant growth, like those in South-
east Asia, were dragged backwards by the far-reaching effects of this crisis.
For the ten years prior to the crisis, countries like Malaysia, Indonesia and
Singapore had enjoyed real year-on-year GDP growth averaging 9.1%,
6.9%, and 2.9% respectively. These figures dropped to 9.9%, 13.25%,
and 0.9% respectively during the two years (1998 and 1999) of the crisis.
The effects on corporate profits were even starker. For the same countries,
average corporate profits during the two crisis years were, respectively,
943%, 84%, and 43% lower than those of the pre crisis year of 1996.
Unemployment levels, compared with those in the previous decade, rose
between 1–2% for most countries in Southeast Asia. Stock markets were
not unscathed – dropping between 45–74% at their lowest points. Data
utilised to obtain the above numbers are from the following sources:
Datastream (stock market movements and GDP), Asian Development
Bank’s key indicators of developing Asian and Pacific countries, volume
32, 2001 (Unemployment), and the Osiris database (corporate profits).
4 From I/B/E/S’s Asia-Pacific data population summary statistics, we observe
that amongst the Southeast Asian countries – Indonesia, Philippines,
Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore – the latter two have the highest num-
ber of companies covered by I/B/E/S (close to 200 as of August 2000).
However, Malaysia is generally regarded as a relatively more closed
economy. This concern is accentuated by her government’s implementa-
tion of capital controls restricting financial flows in and out of the country
at the height of the crisis in September 1998.
5 This notion of forecasts efficiency corresponds most closely to the defini-
tion of informational efficiency of asset prices.
6 Prior literature suggests two additional proxies for earnings-relevant news.
Easterwood and Nutt (1999) propose the use of prior-year forecast error
(earnings surprise) as a proxy for news, whereas Amir and Ganzach (1998)
argue that prior-year forecast revision serves as a better surrogate for
earnings related news. Since the use of these proxies necessitates a
2-year ahead forecast of year t’s earnings, we do not perform the pre
and post-crisis analysis with these proxies as it would shrink the already
small crisis sample. However, we do perform total sample analyses using
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prior-year forecast errors and prior-year forecast revisions as proxy for
news. The unreported results are qualitatively similar to main sample
analyses using PERFt1 and UPERFt1.
7 O’Brien’s (1988) conclusions are based on the time period 1975 to 1982.
Since then, and especially in the 1990s, the lag period between an analyst’s
revision and its inclusion in the I/B/E/S consensus has been greatly
reduced (I/B/E/S Research Bibliography, 1995; and Keane and Runkle,
1998). Therefore our eight-month ahead measure is unlikely to suffer
much from such flaws.
8 We use the Osiris database, which provides specific company accounts data
such as the geographical breakdown of sales for listed firms. The average
figure of 83.2% is estimated by examining individually the main sample’s
top 30 represented firms, which together make up the majority of all firm-
year observations of our main sample. The high percentage implies that a
substantial fraction of the sales of our sample’s firms is generated in Asia.
9 Like Abarbanell and Bernard (1992), Easterwood and Nutt (1999) esti-
mated their models using OLS. We follow their methodology, bearing in
mind that the estimated coefficients should be interpreted with some
caution since the t-stat may be overstated because of possible cross sectional
dependence in the data (across firms) (Bernard, 1987).
10 This seemingly counter intuitive result was also found by Easterwood and
Nutt (1999).
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